Glossary of Platform Law and Policy Terms

Platform Neutrality

Cite this article as:
Konstantinos Stylianou (17/12/2021). Platform Neutrality. In Belli, L.; Zingales, N. & Curzi, Y. (Eds.), Glossary of Platform Law and Policy Terms (online). FGV Direito Rio. https://platformglossary.info/platform-neutrality/.

Author: Konstantinos Stylianou

‘Platform neutrality’ expresses the idea that products or services that function as platforms should not unreasonably discriminate against complements. Platform neutrality was popularized after a report issued by the French National Digital Council (Conseil National du Numérique) in 2014, which advanced numerous recommendations on the issue (CNNum, 2014)1. 

The concept of ‘platform neutrality’ draws on principles developed for utility regulation. Utilities, because of the fundamental services they offer and because they have traditionally been (public or private) monopolies, were regulated to hold themselves out to serve the public indiscriminately, meaning that they cannot make individualized decisions on whether and on what terms to deal with each customer. Modern digital platforms are sometimes seen as performing similar fundamental roles, such as providing the necessary functionality for app ecosystems to emerge (app neutrality) or discoverability through online search – or search neutrality – (Frischmann, 2004)2. If platforms guarantee equal conditions to all complements, then the complements can compete on the merits.

The concept has also been criticized on various grounds. The first is that digital platforms often do not exhibit the same characteristics as traditional utilities, namely, they are neither monopolies nor indispensable nor do they unequivocally offer the same kind of public good services as utilities, and therefore they should not be subject to the same kind of rules. Secondly, discriminatory behavior can be welfare-enhancing and it is therefore generally not banned in the market unless it is unreasonable and distorts market conditions (Yoo, 2004)3. Thirdly, some platform services have to be discriminatory (e.g., ranking of search results), which makes a neutrality principle impossible to implement and even counter-productive (Renda, 2015)4. Because of the tension between the benefits and risks of platform neutrality, regulation in this domain has so far been limited to business to business (B2B) relations and only to light touch obligations that emphasize transparency and accountability rather than banning specific types of conduct (Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services).

References

CNNum. (2014). Platform Neutrality: Building an Open and Sustainable Digital Environment. Opinion n˚. 2014-2.

Frischmann, B. M. (2004). An economic theory of infrastructure and commons management. Minn. L. Rev.,89, 917.

Renda, A. (2015). Antitrust, regulation and the neutrality trap: A plea for a smart, evidence-based internet policy. CEPS Special Report. 104.Yoo, C. S. (2004). Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition-A Comment on the End-to-End Debate. J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L., 3, 23

  1. CNNum. (2014). Platform Neutrality: Building an Open and Sustainable Digital Environment. Opinion n˚. 2014-2.
  2. Frischmann, B. M. (2004). An economic theory of infrastructure and commons management. Minn. L. Rev.,89, 917.
  3. Yoo, C. S. (2004). Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition-A Comment on the End-to-End Debate. J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L., 3, 23.
  4. Renda, A. (2015). Antitrust, regulation and the neutrality trap: A plea for a smart, evidence-based internet policy. CEPS Special Report. 104.
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By Konstantinos Stylianou

Konstantinos Stylianou is an Associate Professor in Competition Law and Regulation at the University of Leeds. His areas of focus are the law and policy of digital markets, antitrust, and blockchain. He has worked on projects funded by the EU, Swedish Competition Authority, Google, Facebook, and Thailand’s National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission among others, and he has been involved with the Hellenic Competition Commission and the Greek Government on the reform of competition law in Greece. He holds an S.J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, where he studied as an Onassis Scholar, an LL.M. from Harvard University, where he studied as a Fulbright Scholar, and an LL.M. and LL.B. from Aristotle University.

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